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TRIANGULATING LAW AND POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Jonathan Chausovsky*
JAMES ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
(UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS 2016). PP. 384. HARDCOVER $45.00. 
JOHN A. FLITER, CHILD LABOR IN AMERICA: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO PROTECT 
CHILDREN (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS 2018). PP. 328. HARDCOVER 
$50.00. PAPERBACK $24.95.
ERIC LOMAZOFF, RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS AND LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO PRESS 2018). PP. 256. HARDCOVER $90.00. PAPERBACK $30.00.
Contractual rights, money and banking, and labor are surely central to the myriad of 
ways in which law can intersect with political development. The three books here each 
take up one of these elements in very different ways.1 Each covers different ranges of 
history: Eric Lomazoff looks primarily at the early national era up through Andrew 
-DFNVRQ¶VYHWRRI WKHUHFKDUWHULQJELOORI WKH%DQNRI WKHUnited States in 1832; James 
(O\¶VQDUUDWLYHRQ WKH&RQWract Clause spans the entire history of the Constitution; and 
-RKQ)OLWHU¶VIRFXVRQFKLOGODERUSULPDULO\WDNHVSODFHGXULQJWKH3URJUHVVLYH(UDDQGWKH
New Deal. The resolution of these issues at given moments in time sets the stage for 
conflict at a later time. The resulting conflict sometimes is over the same issue and 
sometimes sets the stage for conflict in a tangential issue area. Though the issues are 
fundamentally economic, eventually, social issues are implicated²and in case of child 
labor, indicated directly. The sum allows us to triangulate the complexity of elements in 
law and political economy that can drive policy change. There is no grand unified theory 
here: these books are very different, and that variety provides its own richness. 
The place of McCulloch v. Maryland2 is well entrenched in American political 
historiography and doctrinal development, and one might expect there would be little new 
                                                          
*Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs, State University of New York at Fredonia. 
 1. JAMES ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016); JOHN A. FLITER, CHILD 
LABOR IN AMERICA: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO PROTECT CHILDREN (2018); ERIC LOMAZOFF, RECONSTRUCTING 
THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2018). 
 2. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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186 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:185 
to learn. But Eric Lomazoff does just that by identifying the dog that did not bark: the 
Coinage Clause. When teaching McCulloch, some of my students have suggested this 
clause could justify the requisite Congressional power; I have typically responded by 
observing that no key actor used it in 1791, the year the First Bank was established, nor in 
1819, when McCulloch was decided. After all, at the time, the concept of a central bank 
as a regulator of the money supply was poorly understood. Reconstructing the National 
Bank Controversy explodes this notion. 
Lomazoff presents a series of stylized vignettes to several chapters that capture the 
central elements of conventional understandings. Though this might turn off some readers, 
I find it effective. He has a good mind for disaggregating conceptual distinctions. For 
example, he distinguishes three distinct standards of necessity used in the debates on the 
First Bank. The first is functional necessity, which is the classic debate over whether 
³QHFHVVDU\´PHDQV³DEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\´RUPHUHO\³XVHIXO´3 The second is a federal 
understanding: was a state-based alternative available?4 The third standard concerns 
whether this is a power typically exercised by other sovereign governments.5 Even if the 
Bank survived the first standard, it could fail on the second, should other banks exist. 
Notably, Lomazoff claims that opponents did not coalesce around one single objection; 
Representative Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland, for one, argued the bank must satisfy 
all three standards.6 In 1791, no arguments addressed the Coinage Clause nor a monetary 
function. 
In the succeeding years, multiple branches of the National Bank were created, as 
were many state-chartered banks. An open question in 1791 was whether two note-creating 
banks could coexist in the same city. By the end of the decade, it was clear they could; 
each accepted the others notes and settled accounts regularly. The Federal Bank, being 
larger, usually held credit for state bank notes after settlement. It used this leverage to 
regulate credit creation: if a state bank exceeded a reasonable multiple, the Federal Bank 
could present its notes for redemption. This tended to constrict excessive state bank 
lending. Lomazoff draws on Streeck and Thelen to characterize this as institutional drift²
an institution taking on a crucial function distinct from the original purpose.7 Circumstance 
DQGOXFNDSSHDUWRKDYHSOD\HGDUROHLQWKH%DQN¶VEHKDYLRULWGLGQRWDFWDVDSUHGDWRU
Lomazoff credits its twenty-year, time-limited charter combined with two related factors. 
First, H[FHVVLYHO\OLPLWLQJORFDOEDQNVZRXOGEH³SROLWLFDOVXLFLGH,´LQWKDWLWZRXOGKDYH
engendered political opposition to a recharter.8 6HFRQGWKH%DQN¶VPRQHWDU\IXQFWLRQZDV
made apparent from economic events.9
                                                          
 3. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 25, 27. 
 4. Id. at 20. 
 5. Id.
 6. Id. at 25. 
 7. Id. at 30; see also WOLFGANG STREECK & KATHLEEN THELEN, Introduction: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES 1, 26 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005). 
 8. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 60. 
9. Id. at 64. This was also an age of insider lending, done in part as a means of credit monitoring. See NAOMI 
R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1983). 
It is also in an age where the person and the office were not necessarily separated. See, e.g., BRIAN PHILLIPS 
MURPHY, BUILDING THE EMPIRE STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2015). 
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Lomazoff productively directs substantial attention to the recharter battles of 1811, 
1815, and 1816. By 1811, Jeffersonians were divided: some adopted the functionalist 
argument that there was no enumerated power that justified a bank, and others articulated 
the federal argument, pointing to existing state banks.10 Recharter supporters noted the 
bank had gained legitimacy by its existence over twenty years; new branches added during 
-HIIHUVRQ¶VSUHVLGHQF\ IXUWKHUVXSSRUWHG LWVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\2WKHUVXSSRUWHUVQRWHG LWV
monetary regulatory function. Interestingly, Henry Clay claimed this regulatory power 
was itself not enumerated and was therefore unconstitutional.11 With a split Jeffersonian-
Republican coalition, the recharter failed.12
The War of 1812 placed immense stress on Government finances.13 State banks 
suspended specie payments during wartime and delayed resumption. This resulted in 
excessive note circulation, overextended lending, and inflation. To reenact a bank, 
members of Congress needed to either revise their views or find a new justification for 
one. Following a rejection of a new charter in 1815, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
J. Dallas in 1816 predicated the bank not on the power to borrow, but on the Coinage 
Clause.14 The constitutional question concerned whether this referred only to physical 
coins, or to a broader definition of money. Lomazoff argues the 1816 legislation was a 
compromise that allowed a Republican coalition to finesse its divide on the Sweeping 
Clause.15
When this charter was challenged in McCulloch v. Maryland,16 there was no 
discussion of the Coinage Clause nor an account of the bank as a monetary actor.17 Yet, 
LQ  WKH  GHEDWHV ZHUH UHFHQW KLVWRU\ /RPD]RII QRWHV DOVR WKDW 0DU\ODQG¶V
purpose in enacting a tax was to raise revenue, and wonders why Maryland did not simply 
concede the constitutionality of the bank²WKXVUHQGHULQJWKHILUVWSDUWRI-RKQ0DUVKDOO¶V
opinion unnecessary. Lomazoff suggests that perhaps it was Marshall himself who raised 
this question, but he does not have direct evidence, and does not pursue it further.18 But, 
arguably, the misdirection by Marshall in McCulloch approaches that in Marbury v. 
Madison.19
Members of Congress did refer to the coinage argument in the late 1820s. Albert 
Gallatin was recruited to write an article justifying the bank based on the power to regulate 
the currency in the recharter episode of 1832. And, President Andrew Jackson addressed 
the Coinage Clause argument in his veto message, claiming the regulatory power could 
not be delegated to a corporation²identifying the problem as delegation, not existence of 
                                                          
10. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 78±79. 
11. Id. at 89. 
12. Id. at 94. 
13. Id. at 100. 
14. Id. at 112±13; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
15. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 112. He leaves open the question of Madison¶s view of the Coinage Clause 
argument. 
16. Id. at 126. 
17. Id. at 130. 
18. Id. at 124±25, 128, 133. This is a good example of where Lomazoff follows his evidence as far as it goes, 
but no further. 
 19. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans), 
and Why You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003). 
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188 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:185 
Congressional authority.20 Jackson, thus, did accept the monetary power in principle. 
Lomazoff concludes by trying to connect the 1816 justification for the Bank to the 
logic used for the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, as well as more recent 
justifications. He notes that Justice Strong, in Knox v. Lee,21 declined to specifically 
RYHUUXOH-XVWLFH&KDVH¶VGHFLVLRQLQHepburn v. Griswald22 that the Coinage Clause only 
referred to actual metal coins. He suggests that Strong could have done so, and speculates 
that Strong could have had Clay and Calhoun in mind²but this is only thinly supported 
by evidence offered.23
Reconstructing the National Bank Controversy is thought provoking (though at 
times a bit more contentious than seems necessary).24 The constitutional question of 
whether to read the Coinage Clause narrowly, as physical coins only, or broadly to include 
all forms of money implies economic learning. How should advances in economic theory 
impact the interpretation of the Coinage Clause? Should it change when political actors 
implement theoretical developments? After all, for decades after, many prominent 
$PHULFDQVWKRXJKWRIVSHFLHDVEHLQJ³UHDO´UDQJLQJDWOHDVWIURP7KRPDV+DUW%HQWRQ
during antebellum years, to Ron Paul in a colloquy with Ben Bernanke in 2011.25
Bray Hammond, commenting on the development of a fractional reserve ratio of 
five-to-RQHILYHGROODUVOHQWRXWIRUHDFKGROODULQVSHFLHVWDWHG³,GRXEWLIRQHEDQNHU
in four clearly understood what he was doLQJ DQGZKDWPDGH LW VRXQG DQG SURSHU´26
According to Hammond, when the continued existence of the bank was debated, neither 
John Adams nor Thomas Jefferson thought it was legitimate. Hammond suggests that even 
Hamilton did not think it was legitimate in 1791, when the Bank was debated. But 
Lomazoff shows that fractional reserve banking flourished in the 1790s²even if people 
did not understand the what level of reserve ratio was required to establish a stable 
monetary system. Richard Sylla et al. demonstrate Hamilton directed monetary actions in 
the panic of 1792.27 In the financial wake of the War of 1812, and in debates in 1816, it is 
clear that many legislators recognized the monetary regulatory function. 
Lomazoff characterizes McCulloch as an example of departmentalism.28 But this 
VHHPV WR LJQRUH WKH ODVW WZR VHQWHQFHVRI WKDWGHFLVLRQ¶V ILUVWSDUDJUDSKZKHUH -XVWLFH
0DUVKDOOGHFODUHV³>$@QGLILWLVWREHVRGHFLGHGE\WKLVWULEXQDODORQHFDQWKHGHFLVLRQ
be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of our country 
                                                          
20. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 142, 151, 153. 
 21. 79 U.S. 457 (1871). 
 22. 75 U.S. 603 (1869). 
 23. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 161±64. Given that elsewhere Lomazoff is careful not to exceed his evidence, 
the speculation here is striking. 
 24. For example, Lomazoff speculates that Jerry Mashaw, in not mentioning Jackson¶s delegation argument 
must likely have read an edited version of Jackson¶s veto message; perhaps, or perhaps not. See id. at 154 
(referring to JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 100 YEARS OF 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012)). 
 25. On Benton, see BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
CIVIL WAR 341 (1957); Daniel Indiviglio, Bernanke to Ron Paul: Gold Isn’t Money, ATLANTIC (July 13, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/07/bernanke-to-ron-paul-gold-isnt-money/241903/. 
26. HAMMOND, surpa note 25, at 275. 
 27. See Richard Sylla, Robert E. Wright & David J. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis 
Management During the U.S. Financial Panic of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61 (2009). 
 28. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 130±31. 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 21 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 21 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
CHAUSOVSKY, J - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 7:11 AM 
2020] TRIANGULATING LAW AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 189 
GHYROYHGWKLVLPSRUWDQWGXW\´29 It is ambiguous as to whether this statement exemplifies 
mere judicial review, where the judiciary has authority when a dispute comes before it, or 
whether it exemplifies what Keith Whittington terms judicial supremacy²that not only 
must the Supreme Court decide on constitutionality, but the other governmental branches 
DUH WKHQ ERXQG WR IROORZ LW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ30 Mere judicial review is consistent with 
departmentalism, judicial supremacy certainly is not. To me, McCulloch seems ambiguous 
RQ WKLV SRLQW WKRXJK WHQGLQJ WRZDUGV WKH ODWWHU 5HJDUGOHVV -XVWLFH 0DUVKDOO¶V
(purposeful?) omission of the Coinage Clause is significant. 
-DPHV(O\ -U¶VThe Contract Clause spans the entire history of the Constitution 
with a singular doctrinal focus. A similar effort has apparently not been taken up since 
%HQMDPLQ):ULJKW¶V  DQDO\VLV31 The legal history provided is both detailed and 
extensive, exploring the vast permutatioQVRIWKHFODXVH¶VDSSOLFDWLRQV7KHFKDSWHUVDUH
organized by chronological time period, and sections within each chapter concern areas of 
dispute that often recur in multiple chapters. Examples include Public Contracts, 
Bankruptcy Laws, and Judicial Impairments. Ely argues, contra to Wright, that the 
founding generation intended the Contract Clause to apply to contracts where the state is 
a party, as well as those between private parties.32 While evidence from the Philadelphia 
Convention as to the purposes of the clause is thin, he provides some evidence that state 
contracts were meant to be included. 
The Marshall Era evidences strengthened use of the clause. The analysis of Fletcher 
v. Peck,33 for example, centers not on judicial review of state legislation, but whether 
contracts where the state is a party are covered by the clause.34 The Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward case, striking down a state law altering the college charter, is 
characterized as upholding contemporary perspectives, although treating charitable 
corporate charters as contracts.35 More interesting is action in the states. A debt relief law 
in North Carolina asserted the importance of enforcing contractual obligations, while at 
the same time distinguishing the right from the remedy. Yet, the delays inherent in the 
judicial process served to provide temporary relief for debtors to reorganize their affairs.36
This would recur, in other times and circumstances. 
The Taney period is portrayed as substantially continuing the Marshall Court 
doctrine. The Charles River Bridge decision,37 that state-granted contracts did not extend 
to implicit features, modified Dartmouth College and sought to minimize monopoly rights, 
but it maintained the preferred position of contracts. Yet the Contract Clause did not take 
precedence over the power of eminent domain; a state could, with just compensation, 
                                                          
 29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
 30. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY xi (2007). 
 31. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938). 
 32. ELY, supra note 1, at 18±22. 
 33. 10 U.S. 87, 137 (1810). 
 34. ELY, supra note 1, at 32±35. 
 35. Id. at 36±39; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
36. ELY, supra note 1, at 43±44. 
 37. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). This decision ruled that the state could build 
a competing bridge irrespective of an existing state grant for a bridge over the same river. 
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abrogate a contractual grant.38 So too for police powers.39 But a state could issue tax 
exemptions that would bind future legislatures²with three Southern Justices objecting 
strenuously, fearing apparently for states rights.40 So there were serious conceptual 
tensions in which state sovereign powers could not be bargained away via contracts made 
by the state and state sovereign power which could. One significant difference between 
Marshall and Taney concerned the relation of a contractual right and its remedy: Marshall 
conceived of them as distinct, while Taney conceived of right and remedy as intrinsically 
connected.41 But the question is whether parties in advance might reasonably anticipate 
whether remedy might be altered later. In Bronson v. Kinzie,42 the Taney Court ruled that 
a legislature could bind its successors in some areas; this strengthened the rights of those 
with state contracts. But during financial panics, some state-level courts granted the 
validity of debt relief laws, contra to Supreme Court rulings.43
Civil War and Reconstruction inevitably raised questions related to times of war. 
Were wartime debts contracted with Confederate currency satisfied if paid with notes that 
had since become severely devalued? Could equity as a principle prevail over the strict 
terms of the contracts? Were debts that were contracted for slaves but not paid valid in the 
wake of the Thirteenth Amendment?44 Does the immorality of slavery, now abolished, 
impact prior slave purchase contracts, where a creditor makes a claim for the sale? These 
TXHVWLRQVYH[HGWKHFRXUWV7KHDQVZHUVSURYLGHDQLQWHUHVWLQJJORVVRQWKH³PHHWLQJRI
WKHPLQGV´WKHRU\RIFRQWUDFW²here the meeting of the minds did not control the outcome, 
yet this was well before Holmes made his contribution to contract theory where he 
FULWLFL]HG WKH ³PHHWLQJ RI WKHPLQGV´ FRQFHSWLRQ+ROPHV LQVWHDG DGYRFDWHG REMHFWLYH
standards.45
A gradual decline and then precipitous fall followed. During the Gilded Age, the 
artificiality of the distinction between right and remedy was increasingly recognized. 
(OLPLQDWLQJGHEWRU¶VMDLOPLJKWKDYHZHDNHQHGWKHFKDQFHVRIDFUHGLWRUUHFRXSLQJWKHLU
loss, but society and the courts considered the practice archaic.46 Debt relief measures 
were enacted during economic downturns, designed particularly to alleviate those in 
distressed rural communities.47 Whether corporate charters should be characterized as 
contracts was disputed,48 and railroad rates, even if publicly contracted, were subject to 
succeeding regulations.49 Justice Shiraz wrote for a unanimous Court that contracts made 
for public purposes, pursuant to a legislative act, were subject to revision. A subsequent 
                                                          
 38. ELY, supra note 1, at 76±77. 
39. Id. at 77±78. 
40. Id. at 82±85. 
41. Id. at 88. 
 42. 42 U.S. 311 (1843). 
 43. ELY, supra note 1, at 89±93. 
44. Id. at 113±14. 
 45. See MORTON J. HORWITZ. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 35±38 (1992); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 181 (Harcourt, Brace & Howe Inc. 1920). 
 46. ELY, supra note 1, at 149. 
47. Id. at 151±52. 
48. Id. at 152±55. 
49. Id. at 155±57. 
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legislature could change the terms of the law without violating the Contract Clause.50
Elements of public policy exposed stresses on distinctions between policies that could 
infringe on the Contract Clause right, and those that could not. Thus debts could be 
discharged under bankruptcy law, and police powers could be upheld against claims that 
the exertion of the power reduced contracted property values.51 By the end of the Gilded 
Age, the Due Process Clause was increasingly supplanting the Contract Clause as 
protection for economic rights. 
Even prior to the New Deal, new economic developments led to increasing stress on 
a strict construction of the Clause. For example, rent controls in Washington, D.C. and 
New York City during World War I led to questions of what constitutes an emergency, 
and whether courts could review legislative decisions to declare an emergency.52 But 
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell was the watershed moment, with Chief Justice 
Hughes providing rationales for allowing legislative moratoriums on mortgage 
contracts.53 Certainly the New Deal financial crisis was an emergency, and that declaration 
by Hughes might have indicated some limitations. But by the early 1940s, Justice 
Frankfurter declared that the exertion of state police power could be implied for all 
contracts, thus permitting legislatures to do what they wanted, as opposed to emphasizing 
the sanctity of contracts as the basis of a free society.54
Ely provides an extensive history of private Contract Clause disputes over debt relief 
laws, dating to at least the 1807 economic stress, with more following the War of 1812.55
When analyzing BlaisdellKHFULWLTXHVWKH1HZ'HDO&RXUW¶VXVHRIEDODQFLQJWHVWVUDWKHU
than absolute prohibition of contracts. However, he does not place the use of balancing 
tests in context; Morton Horwitz identifies Holmes as providing the first theoretical 
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUXVHRIDEDODQFLQJWHVWLQKLVHVVD\³3ULYLOHJH0DOLFHDQG,QWHQW´56
Ely does not wrestle with this legacy. Further, by the Great Depression, the economy was 
vastly more interconnected than before, and economic theory had advanced substantially. 
While the Marginal Revolution of the 1870s could support a strict interpretation of the 
Contract CODXVH .H\QHV¶ General Theory DQG 6FKXPSHWHU¶V History of Economic 
Analysis suggest substantially more room for governmental intervention, particularly in a 
FULVLV$QGDVWULFW&RDVHDQYLHZPHUHO\QHHGDGRSW)UDQNIXUWHU¶VYLHZWKDWWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of government intervention can be implied for all contracts. The lack of perfectly clear and 
stable property rights may reduce overall social output, but it is the world of politics that 
impinges on it.57 2UWRSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\WKH³QHHGIRUVSHHG´WKDW+RZDUG6FKZHEHU
                                                          
50. Id. at 164. 
51. ELY, supra note 1, at 162. 
52. Id. at 198. 
 53. 209 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 54. ELY, supra note 1, at 232±33. The relevant opinion was E. N.Y. Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230
(1945). 
55. ELY, supra note 1, at 43. 
 56. HORWITZ, supra note 45, at 131; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV.
1, 5 (1894). 
 57. On marginalism, see R.D. COLLISON BLACK, A.W. COATS & CRAWFORD D.W. BLACK, THE MARGINAL 
REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS: INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION (1973); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE 
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1964); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1996); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm. 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 22 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 22 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
CHAUSOVSKY, J - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 7:11 AM 
192 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:185 
identifies during the period of railroad expansion provided the sort of economic impetus 
for legal alteration of property rights, Contract Clause or not.58 And Coase did not care 
what the law was, only that it was clear and stable. Given the Schumpeterian creative 
destruction process of new industries supplanting existing businesses, a regulatory role for 
WKH VWDWH FRXOG KHOS VPRRWK WKH WUDQVLWLRQ ,I VR WKHQ )UDQNXUWHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW
government action can be implied for all contracts provides a solution: the role of 
government is expected, and the resulting property rights regime sufficiently clear and 
stable enough to satisfy that Coasean imperative. 
While Ely laments the demise of the Contract Clause during the New Deal, John 
Fliter celebrates the demise of the worst forms of child labor in that same time period. The 
landmark cases of Hammer v. Dagenhart59 and United States v. Darby60 bracket one of 
the seminal conflicts in American constitutional development concerning the powers of 
the Federal Government: Hammer struck down a child labor law, and was expressly 
overturned in Darby. An effort seeking to glean the essence of the political disputes over 
the labor issues from within the four corners of the United States Reports leads to a 
WUXQFDWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ)OLWHU¶V&hild Labor in America provides a corrective. 
He begins depicting the child labor problem as it developed in the first industrial 
revolution, starting with the decline of the guild system. Child labor for some families was 
an economic good. Children worked in jobs requiring manual dexterity, such as textiles, 
and in dangerous conditions, such as coal mines. Many became poisoned from arsenic, 
nicotine, or coal dust and worked extremely long hours. In the late 1800s, piecework 
performed in tenements of urban areas by parents and children added a new dimension to 
the child labor problem. 
Few states enacted child labor laws. The patchwork of state labor bureaus produced 
uneven record gathering, inspection, and enforcement. In many Southern states laws were 
nonexistent. The federal government haltingly began to investigate conditions, including 
an 1892 investigation of the sweating system. The 1898 Industrial Commission report 
identified evidence of widespread child labor and found little justification for it. A review 
of state laws found state labor laws did work in the states that enacted them and also 
connected child education needs to the child labor problem.61
The National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) was formed in 1904. It initially 
focused on information gathering, public education, and state-level action, including 
mandatory education. Indiana Senator Albert Beverage was the principle legislative 
sponsor for a federal child labor law. His first bill proposed a ban on interstate shipment 
of goods made with child labor; this ostensibly would fall under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause and was consistent with Champion v. Ames.62 It would be a model for the bill that 
was enacted a decade later. President Roosevelt committed only to an investigative bureau, 
while opponents feared loss of state autonomy. 
                                                          
 58. HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850±1880: TECHNOLOGY,
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP (2004). 
 59. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 60. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 61. FLITER, supra note 1, at 35±36. 
62. Id. at 58±65; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
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The Keating-2ZHQ$FWRIDGRSWHGPXFKRI%HYHULGJH¶VSURSRVHGFRQWHQW63
This led to the Hammer v. Dagenhart drama, where the Supreme Court ruled the Act 
exceeded congressional power. Fliter effectively narrates the legal arguments surrounding 
the apparent inconsistencies in Due Process and Commerce Clause jurisprudence at the 
time. Activists were confident that the moral and health concerns of children could justify 
the exemption of child labor from the Due Process doctrine that privileged contractual 
liberty. But of course Hammer ruled that since the articles made by children were harmless, 
the morality-based exceptions did not apply. This is well known. But Fliter provides 
evidence that the Keating-Owen Act actually did reduce incidences of child labor, only to 
increase again following Hammer.64 State laws continued to vary, and states with lax laws 
did attract employers seeking low-wage labor. 
After this defeat, advocates shifted their tactics to the Taxation Clause, by taxing the 
profits of firms using children fourteen years or younger. This seemed more likely to 
survive judicial review in light of McCray v. United States,65 which upheld a tax on 
oleomargarine. Opponents in the Senate filled the Congressional Record in anticipation of 
a legal challenge; they asserted that tax revenue was pretextual and that the act would 
regulate areas properly left to states. Nonetheless, it was enacted and also was effective in 
reducing employment of children.66 Opponents brought test cases before sympathetic 
Federal Judge James Boyd in North Carolina²the same judge who struck down the 
Keating-Owen Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court struck it down, with Chief Justice Taft 
distinguishing this issue from other permitted federal taxes (such as on phosphorous 
matches and narcotics).67
Stymied again, child advocates sought to amend the Constitution to allow Congress 
to regulate child labor. One constitutional issue concerned language. An early version used 
³HPSOR\PHQW´EXWEHFDXVHVRPHFKLOGUHQZRUNZLWKSDUHQWVRIIWKHSD\UROODGYRFDWHV
IDYRUHGWKHZRUG³ODERU´68 But this caused concern because it seemed to include work 
done on a farm. A second issue concerned whether concurrent state power should be 
included in the text. A proposal for ratification by state conventions failed.69 The Child 
Labor Amendment then passed both Houses overwhelmingly; it did not include an 
expiration date. 
Interest groups mobilized on both sides for state ratification debates. Opponents 
claimed that these were socialist ideas that would lead to federal encroachment and the 
destruction of parental authority. The Catholic Church came out against it, seeing it as a 
vehicle that, combined with education laws, would weaken Catholic schools and parental 
authority. It received nearly unanimous defeat in Southern states. But it also failed 
spectacularly in an advisory referendum in Massachusetts, and then in the New York State 
Legislature.70 A renewed effort to ratify the Amendment came during the Great 
                                                          
63. FLITER, supra note 1, at 86±87; Keating-Owens Act, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916). 
64. Id. at 95±96. 
 65. 195 U.S. 27 (1904). 
 66. FLITER, supra note 1, at 101±06. 
67. Id. at 114±17; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
68. FLITER, supra note 1, at 139±40. 
69. Id. at 140. 
70. Id. at 150±54. 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 23 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 23 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
CHAUSOVSKY, J - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 7:11 AM 
194 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:185 
Depression. Fourteen states ratified the Amendment in 1933, and several states passed 
more restrictive child labor laws.71
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) included codes for labor that 
restricted child labor. Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a blanket code effective to end of 
1933, limiting work to those at least sixteen years old, with some minor exceptions. The 
HIIHFWZDVVLJQLILFDQWRYHUFKLOGUHQ³ORVW´ZRUNDVDUHVXOW72 Success of the codes 
slowed momentum for Child Labor Amendment. 
After A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States73 invalidated NIRA, the 
incidence of child labor again increased. This in turn led to renewed efforts to ratify the 
Child Labor Amendment. By late 1930s, twenty-eight states had ratified the Child Labor 
Amendment, still short of the thirty-six needed.74 It is one of six constitutional 
DPHQGPHQWV DSSURYHG E\ &RQJUHVV WKDW UHPDLQV ³RXW WKHUH´ XQUDWLILHG 7KHUH ZHUH
FRQFHUQV³WKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWPLJKWKROd that the Amendment was not ratified in a 
UHDVRQDEOH DPRXQW RI WLPH´75²an interesting episode in light of the Twenty-Seventh 
$PHQGPHQW¶VXQXVXDO-year path to ratification. Kentucky and Kansas each ratified it 
in the 1930s, reversing earlier rejections. This led to litigation and a ruling that the earlier 
rejections had no legal significance. 
7KH³6ZLWFK LQ7LPH´FOHDUO\SURvided the federal government authority to 
regulate. Despite this, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that would implement some 
regulations was hotly contested and revised multiple times. The FLSA moved out of the 
House Rules Committee only with a discharge petition. It was initially defeated on the 
floor of the House (a first for FDR), before being resurrected in shorter form. It was 
enacted, but only after another discharge petition got it to the floor of the House.76 This 
was the law upheld in United States. v. Darby and which explicitly overruled Hammer v. 
Dagenhart.
Each of these monographs depicts economic learning and the impact on law. Early 
Americans learned about the monetary function, mid-century Americans discovered the 
challenge of displacement by more advanced technological developments, and child labor 
advocates learned that state-based regulations did not work in an increasingly 
interconnected world. The triangulation of these narratives can serve as a sort of substitute 
for overarching theories of political economic development. The turn of the century 
economist Edwin R.A. Seligman noted that, for all its flaws, Marx presented the first 
theory of historical development.77 In that approach, the economic base determines much 
of the societal superstructure. While over-determined, there is something in the core of 
economic changes that impact other changes. Other attempts to provide a comprehensive 
developmental logic, such as critical realignment theory, have unsurprisingly fallen 
                                                          
71. Id. at 158±59. 
72. Id. at 161±62. 
 73. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 74. FLITER, supra note 1, at 185. 
75. Id. at 180. 
76. Id. at 200±04. 
 77. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 26±27 (2d ed. 1907); see also
WILLIAM H. SHAW, MARX¶S THEORY OF HISTORY (1978). 
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short.78 Whether intending to do so or not, each of these works sheds light on ways in 
which the thickening of the political and economic universe was filtered through legal 
structures. And a fair reading allows us to recognize the inevitable tension in the change. 
The intersection in some instances is direct. The Legal Tender Cases, for example, 
are significant for Ely because they explore how stresses on complications with contracts, 
and political-economic predilections of the Justices, most notably Justice Chase, impact 
contract doctrine. For Lomazoff, the significance is the extent to which the Coinage Clause 
debates from 1816 and 1832 managed to find their way into the consciousness of the 
Justices. The episodes serve different purposes, and the divergent purposes have distinct 
implications for economic policy in each work. Some caution and humility seems 
warranted as a result. Different authors identify different stress points, even within the 
same legal opinion. Each follows the logic to its logical conclusion. But the different foci 
RI WKH DXWKRUV VXJJHVW PXOWLIDFHWHG VHWV RI LPSOLFDWLRQV ZKHUHE\ WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V
perspective drives the conclusion. 
Emergencies, unsurprisingly, impact each narrative, whether financial stress of the 
War of 1812, of contracts made in confederate dollars during the Civil War, or child labor 
in the Great Depression. The latter provides both a death knell for the Contract Clause, 
while simultaneously providing opportunity for progress on child labor legislation. The 
same New Deal that eviscerated the Contract Clause empowered government to implement 
the culmination of a decades-long movement to eradicate child labor. Each work identifies 
the many veto points, complicated processes, and obstacles to enacting significant social 
legislation in the United States. One author gnashes his teeth, while the others celebrate, 
but for very different reasons. Would it have been possible to have federal authority of 
child labor without limiting the reach of the Contract Clause? 
Reading these books in tandem suggests a vibrancy for exploring the intersection of 
economic developments and law, and they suggest a myriad on multidirectional 
interactions and effects. The scholarly triangulation process, of course, requires a 
multitude of such monographs read by a single observer. The hope is that eventually the 
sum is even greater than the parts. 
                                                          
 78. See generally, e.g., THE END OF REALIGNMENT? INTERPRETING AMERICAN ELECTORAL ERAS (Byron E. 
Shafer ed., 1991); DAVID R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE 
(2002). Stephen Skowronek¶s theory on presidential regimes wraps developmental logic within a political regime 
structure. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993). Bruce Ackerman¶s theory of constitutional moments arguably is consonant 
with realignment theory but does place constitutional conflict at the center. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
